Review of The Undiscovered Dewey: Religion, Morality, and the Ethos of Democracy by McCollum, James C
Book Review
The Undiscovered Dewey: Religion, Morality, and the Ethos 
of Democracy
James C. McCollum
Melvin L. Rogers, Th e Undiscovered Dewey: Religion, Morality, and the Ethos of 
Democracy. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. 328 + xxi pp. ISBN 978-
0-231-14486-5. $50.00 (hbk.)
Sensitive readers of Dewey will note that his style and the confi dence with which he 
expresses his views oft en obscure their radical nature. Dewey fully understood that 
Darwin overthrew both the necessity of human progress and the fi xity of  nature. 
Nonetheless, Dewey has been saddled by some critics with a naive intransigence 
about the hopeful prospects for human inquiry. Fortunately, Melvin Rogers has 
provided Dewey scholarship with a recovery of the Darwinian grounds of Dewey’s 
philosophy and its broader consequences for Deweyan thought. Simply put, because 
the world is fraught with prospects for both failure and success, or evolution and 
extinction, this makes active inquiry into morality and science all the more neces-
sary, not all the more hopeless. 
Rogers’s book, Th e Undiscovered Dewey: Religion, Morality, and the Ethos of 
Democracy, attempts two things. Th e fi rst is to rescue Dewey from critics who see 
him as naively optimistic concerning the prospects of human inquiry. Th e second 
is to interweave this insight into the “historical framework in which Dewey’s appre-
ciation of Darwin is located . . . and distill his understanding of its epistemological 
and normative importance in guiding human life” (x). Th e book is divided into two 
parts, the fi rst of which situates Dewey in America’s confrontation with Darwin at 
the beginning of the twentieth century. Rogers recounts both pessimistic and op-
timistic accounts of the signifi cance of Darwin for understanding whether or not 
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human moral progress is possible. Th e pessimists, exemplifi ed in Rogers’s narra-
tive by Charles Hodge, deny that an evolutionary understanding of human nature 
can provide “something of substance” that can “bestow meaning and direction on 
our lives” (40). On the other hand, those whom Rogers dubs “liberal protestants” 
appropriate Darwin to provide a bulwark against scientism, which would be inevi-
table if Darwin were left  in the hands of the scientists. Within this debate, Dewey 
appears as the philosopher who takes Darwin seriously in recognizing the contin-
gency and fl ux of human and animal life, but who nevertheless “seeks to nurture 
an aestheticized notion of human action in craft ing a meaningful existence”(52). 
In chapter 2, the second half of part 1, Rogers gives a novel reading of Dewey 
in which the Aristotelian categories of knowledge are superimposed upon Dewey’s 
own concepts of agency and inquiry. Th is superimposition reveals that Aristotle’s 
distinction between epistēmē, phronēsis and technē are collapsed in Dewey’s phi-
losophy of action. Deweyan inquiry, like Arisotelian phronēsis, is a dynamic in-
terplay between the self and the world, neither of which remains static if touched 
by the other. In the context of an “aleatory world” (87), the agent of practical wis-
dom negotiates its complexity by virtue of a sensitivity made possible only via the 
“second nature” acquired as a result of experience and enculturation. Th us, Rogers 
explains Dewey’s philosophy of action through John McDowell’s appropriation of 
Aristotle in which action and perception are always already normative and con-
ceptual, respectively. Although normative and conceptual elements pre-exist any 
particular action, Dewey shows us how they are transformed in our transactions 
with the world. Rogers argues that an agent acquires practical wisdom at the mo-
ment she becomes cautious and humble in applying habitual categories to a prob-
lematic situation, always ready to revise these categories no matter how engrained. 
Th is cautious humility is integral to Dewey’s new understanding of metaphysics. 
Th is metaphysics is directed toward the inquiring agent, where “experience is the 
primary touchpoint,” not the objects experienced (100). Th e nature of the object is 
always contestable and changeable, but the usefulness of inquiry for the refl ective 
agent confronting a world in which there are no eternal truths is not.
In part 2,  “Religion, the Moral Life, and Democracy,” applies Rogers’s insights 
concerning Dewey’s confrontation with contingency to religion, morality, and poli-
tics. Chapter 3 is an extended exegesis of Dewey’s A Common Faith. What emerges 
from this extended treatment is an explanation of Dewey’s religious naturalism and 
its relation to the ideals that guide our moral outlook and undergird our hope in the 
future. Rogers argues that ideals do not merely command intellectual assent; “their 
authoritative role in action ultimately runs ahead of evidentiary support or external 
authorization into a ‘world of surmise, of mystery, [and] uncertainties’”(142). Th is, 
for Rogers, is the entry of the imagination into guiding our lives, for although the 
self is always incomplete and fractured, we may imagine ourselves as psychologically 
integrated wholes in full harmony both externally and internally. Our imagination 
directs us by giving us the means to imagine complete harmony within ourselves 
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and with our social and natural environments. Th is at once gripping and guiding 
vision is the faith which Dewey has in mind and which Rogers eloquently describes. 
Rogers moves to chapter 4 with an appreciation of the signifi cance of the imag-
ination and the ideals which it engenders within our practical self-understanding, 
but the task for chapter 4 is to combine these insights with the “way the post-Dar-
winian development of Dewey’s philosophy mitigates any presumptive belief in syn-
thetic harmony”(146). Th us, our image of psychological and social harmony which 
animates our projects is threatened by the possibility of confl ict in the conditions of 
pluralism. Rogers argues that this possibility does not signal any deep crisis in nor-
mative evaluation for Dewey. Rather, pluralism makes the mutual responsiveness of 
the moral domain all the more necessary. As Rogers elaborates via a close reading 
of “Th ree Independent Factors of Morals,” this is no easy task because even moral 
concepts like goodness, rightness, and virtue are not reducible to one another. Th e 
domain of action and morality always registers competing demands and, hence, 
cannot be negotiated passively. Rogers’s reconstruction of Dewey again marks the 
importance of the imagination in reaching decisions that cannot be reduced to a 
mere hedonic calculus or a set of pregiven ends. Moral agency, and the perceptive 
condition it requires, do not rest upon calculations or principles. Rather, principles 
inform the agent’s construal of the salient aspects of the situation, allowing for a 
more informed imaginative rehearsal of “the unfolding of our habits and the so-
lutions to which they would potentially commit us” (181). Th is simultaneously al-
lows the moral agent to appreciate the complexity of the situation while giving her 
critical distance without transcendence. But even this formulation is too narrow:
Th us far we have been fi lling out the ideal perceptive condition by pointing 
to the narrative quality of judgment and the way it reveals how things mat-
ter to us, the role of the imagination, and the place of principles in helping 
us to note the salience of the situation. Th e fi nal element is the recurrence 
of mutual responsiveness. When Dewey comes back to mutual respon-
siveness, especially in thinking about deliberation, it appears through the 
concept of sympathy. (179)
Here, Rogers introduces the importance of sympathy for extending the scope of de-
liberation that allows for a situated yet impartial perspective on the value of compet-
ing goods in moral confl ict. True to his task, however, Rogers again reintroduces the 
possibility of tragic choice into the highly complex moral landscape. Rogers seems 
to relegate the question of incommensurable values as something to be discovered 
in inquiry, but he denies that Dewey is naive in assuming all deliberations will result 
in a suffi  cient reconstruction of our moral landscape to transcend confl icts within 
the self or with others. Even if we are successful, there may be looming feelings of 
loss and regret that terminally evade unifi cation into a coherent psychological or 
social whole. Dewey’s experimental stance can accommodate both persistent con-
fl ict and tragic choice, but to Rogers, Dewey underplays their importance because 
of their rarity. Tragedy does not await us at every turn.
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Chapter 5 turns to the political consequences of Dewey’s philosophy of action 
and inquiry. As is de rigueur in Dewey scholarship, Rogers discusses the Dewey-
Lippman debate. While this is well-trod ground, Rogers evinces a rich discussion 
that successfully captures the contours of Dewey’s response by including an alternate 
conceptual space for democracy provided by Richard Wolin. On Walter Lippman’s 
account, the masses are not omni-competent citizens capable of making informed 
decisions in complex societies, so the only place for democracy is periodic selection 
of elites to guide the technocratic regime. On Wolin’s account, given regimented 
forms of representation and governance, the only place for democracy resides out-
side constitutional channels so that people may harness the revolutionary zeal re-
quired to undercut the power structure from outside. By placing Dewey’s account 
between these two poles, Rogers prepares a middle ground for Dewey to inhabit. 
While elites will play a role in modern governance, their knowledge does not have 
the multiperspectival character necessary for negotiating the myriad situations in 
which citizens are embedded. Hence the public’s contestatory role in managing 
power relations impedes domination while the emergence of new publics, like so-
cial movements, facilitate emancipatory social criticism for challenging and trans-
gressing the bounds of ordinary and habitual political life. Dewey’s vision of the 
public allows for both their situatedness within a given regime and constitution as 
well as their emergence in new situations that overstep the boundaries of existing 
political arrangements. 
All in all, Rogers’s book is a welcome addition to the literature on Dewey. 
Despite its focus on contingency and Dewey’s appropriation of Darwin, it retains 
an expansive scope that makes it suitable for suggested reading on syllabi for ad-
vanced undergraduate and graduate students. Th e book foregoes long discussions 
about education, however, so it is probably better suited to an audience with ex-
plicitly philosophical interests. Th is being said, there are a few respects in which 
the book falls short. Rogers’s focus on the Aristotelian categories of knowledge and 
wisdom is more suitable for a stand-alone article or even another book. Indeed, 
Rogers has a stand-alone article on this topic.1 Here it unnecessarily complicates 
the account of inquiry because although Aristotle appreciates the imprecision of 
ethical inquiry and its contextual nature, Dewey is an appreciative but consum-
mate critic of Aristotle. Th is leaves the reader the task of sorting out the precise 
extent to which the analogy between Deweyan practical intelligence and phronēsis 
holds.  Likewise, Rogers seems to muddy the water with the notion of immanent 
normativity. Th e sophisticated allusions to Brandom and McDowell that specify 
this notion are highly instructive, yet they fall short of a full-fl edged philosophi-
cal explication of Dewey’s take on the eternally contentious and dense issue of 
normativity.  Still, these criticisms only underscore how very suggestive the book 
is for future scholarship. Rogers’s book opens these vistas with surprising clarity 
and philosophical acumen.
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